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THE REACH OF THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE: THE
FATE OF TINKER IN THE AGE OF DIGITAL SOCIAL
MEDIA
Mickey Lee Jett+
Anyone reflecting on his or her days in secondary school will probably
recall a teacher or administrator whom students ridiculed. Students may have
whispered comments about this person during lunch and passed notes behind
his or her back during class. Fast forward to the present. Today a student has
the ability to create a social-media website profile about a school
administrator, allowing the student to ridicule that principal or teacher within a
digital social environment.1 Access and exposure to such online student
speech is no longer restricted to the “live” interaction of passing classmates in
school corridors, but instead moves in virtual channels that can instantly reach
a wide audience.
Although in a broader social world protected by the First Amendment, “one
man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric,”2 how far should the freedom of speech
extend in schools? Should a student acceptance speech imbued with sexual
innuendo and given before an audience of young teenagers enjoy First
Amendment protection?3 Should lewd or otherwise offensive speech directed
at a classmate or teacher be protected?4 Now that the Internet is an influential
and integral part of everyday life, social media sites have evolved into
expansive forums that students depend on to connect with their peers.5 When
+
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unwavering support and kind encouragement throughout his time in law school.
1. See Bryan Starrett, Tinker’s Facebook Profile: A New Test for Protecting Student Cyber
Speech, 14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 212, 213–16 (2009) (describing the growing use of
social-networking sites such as Facebook to provide a new platform through which students can
communicate).
2. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25–26 (1971) (stating that the word “fuck” should be
protected even though it is perhaps more distasteful than other swear words, because words have
the ability to communicate ideas and concepts, as well as to convey inexpressible emotions).
3. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677–78 (1986) (holding that lewd
and sexually explicit speech is not protected under the First Amendment).
4. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 920, 932 (3d Cir.
2011) (en banc) (holding that the First Amendment protects offensive comments about a principal
originating online and off campus), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
5. See Facebook Statistics, Stats & Facts for 2011, DIGITAL BUZZ BLOG (Jan. 18, 2011),
http://www.digitalbuzzblog.com/facebook-statistics-stats-facts-2011/ (“[Forty-eight percent] of
18–34 year olds check Facebook when they wake up, with 28% doing so before even getting out
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are these new Internet technologies understood as offering channels for free
expression, and when are they seen as introducing new avenues for schoolyard
If freedom of expression is limited upon entering the
bullying?6
schoolhouse gate, how far do these restrictions extend when students engage in
expression about school-related matters through digital means?7
The right to speak one’s mind is one of our nation’s most fundamental
rights.8 In certain contexts, this right extends to a student’s criticism of his
teachers.9 The exact contours of students’ First Amendment rights however,
remain ambiguous.10 The fountainhead of the Supreme Court’s student-speech
jurisprudence is Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,
a landmark Warren-Court decision giving students substantial freedom of
speech rights.11 Subsequent cases narrowed Tinker’s holding to provide
greater deference to school officials’ decisions to restrict student speech.12
The Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of Internet speech generated
outside of school.13 Without any guidance or direction from the Supreme
of bed.”); see also Kaitlin M. Gurney, Comment, Myspace, Your Reputation: A Call to Change
Libel Laws for Juveniles Using Social Networking Sites, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 241, 246 (2009)
(stating that social-networking sites attract a younger demographic).
6. Robin M. Kowalski, Cyber Bullying: Recognizing and Treating Victim and Aggressor,
PSYCHIATRIC TIMES (Oct. 1, 2008), http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/display/article/ 10168/13
36550.
7. See Jan Hoffman, Online Bullies Pull Schools Into the Fray, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2010,
at A1 (discussing the reluctance of school officials to assert authority over cyber bullying that
occurs off campus).
8. DAVID J. BODENHAMER, OUR RIGHTS 65 (2007).
9. Requa v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 492 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1283 (W.D. Wash. 2007)
(noting that while “[a] student’s right to criticize his or her teachers is a right secured by the
Constitution,” criticism occurring in a classroom environment is not protected).
10. See Starrett, supra note 1, at 221 (emphasizing that the Court has yet to address
off-campus, online student speech); Emily Gold Waldman, Badmouthing Authority: Hostile
Speech About School Officials and the Limits of School Restrictions, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 591, 594, 617–18 (2011) (noting that the Supreme Court has created only a “general student
speech framework,” and explicating that off-campus student speech has only been mentioned in
passing).
11. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Sean R.
Nuttall, Rethinking the Narrative on Judicial Deference in Student Speech Cases, 83 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1282, 1304 (2008) (noting that, among scholars, Tinker represents the “high-water mark”
for student speech).
12. Nathan S. Fronk, Doninger v. Niehoff: An Example of Public Schools’ Paternalism and
the Off-Campus Restriction of Students’ First Amendment Rights, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1417,
1418 (2010).
13. See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 603–04
(W.D. Pa. 2007) (recognizing that the Supreme Court has not developed a standard for assessing
off-campus speech), aff’d, 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012);
Joseph A. Tomain, Cyberspace Is Outside the Schoolhouse Gate: Offensive, Online Student
Speech Receives First Amendment Protection, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 97, 98 (2010) (“Although the
United States Supreme Court has not yet considered whether schools have jurisdiction over online
student speech, its opportunity may be fast approaching.”).
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Court, lower courts have differed in their analyses of whether school officials
have the authority to subject off-campus cyberspeech to disciplinary action.14
Inherent in these lower court opinions is the difficulty in applying traditional
school-speech jurisprudence to cyberspeech.15
Recently, the Second and Third Circuit Courts of Appeal have attempted to
resolve this dilemma by offering interpretations of Tinker that extend its
constitutional doctrine to off-campus cyberspeech.16 Although both circuits
applied the substantial disruption test identified in Tinker,17 the underlying
principles governing the circuits’ decisions differed greatly.18 The Third
Circuit treated Tinker as an appropriate foundation for providing off-campus
student speech protection under the First Amendment.19 By contrast, the
Second Circuit displaced Tinker’s doctrinal matrix in favor of a balancing

14. See, e.g., D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist., 647 F.3d 754, 765–66 (8th
Cir. 2011) (applying Tinker when analyzing whether the school was authorized to suspend a
student who threatened to kill classmates through an instant message to another classmate);
Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 38–39 (2d Cir. 2007)
(holding that because it was reasonably foreseeable that the school administration would discover
the off-campus speech, the speech would cause a substantial disruption in the school
environment); J.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1108 (C.D. Cal.
2010) (applying Tinker to regulate off-campus speech by upholding a student’s two-day
suspension for ridiculing another student on YouTube); Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365,
1371–72 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (noting that off-campus speech, when specifically directed at the
school, can be treated as on-campus speech); Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 781–82,
784 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (noting that even if the online speech in question occurred on-campus,
disciplinary action is only appropriate if it substantially interferes with the school’s educational
efforts); Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1089–90 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (finding
that a student-created website featuring mock obituaries of his friends was off-campus speech that
was outside the school’s disciplinary purview); J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847,
864 (Pa. 2002) (analyzing whether speech could be classified as on-campus by using a geographic
standard based on where the speech occurred).
15. See Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d at 864–66 (basing the analysis of whether to
apply Tinker and other Supreme Court student-expression jurisprudence on whether the speech in
question was “on-campus”). But see Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38–39 (applying Tinker’s
substantial-disruption test to off-campus speech); see also Renee L. Servance, Cyberbullying,
Cyber-Harassment, and the Conflict Between Schools and the First Amendment, 2003 WIS. L.
REV. 1213, 1235–36 (noting that spatial boundaries for the Internet are nonexistent and thus
“geographical distinction[s] [are] no longer a logical border to school jurisdiction over student
speech”).
16. See Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 499
(2011); Layshock, 650 F.3d at 205; J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915
(3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); see also infra Part III.A.
17. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509, 514 (1969) (holding
that students wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam war did not “forecast substantial
disruption of or material interference with school activities,” thus barring school officials from
restraining the expression).
18. See infra Part III.A.
19. See infra notes 141–45 and accompanying text.
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approach that carries wide-ranging and negative consequences for students’
First Amendment expressive-rights jurisprudence.20
This Note examines whether the Tinker doctrine has a continuing role in
establishing the contours of First Amendment protection for student expression
by examining the recent cases in the Second and Third Circuits. This Note
first roadmaps relevant past law, charting the general doctrinal basis defining
First Amendment protection before Tinker and setting the stage for Tinker’s
narrower pronouncements on student expression. It also discusses the Tinker
doctrine and addresses relevant post-Tinker precedent. Next, this Note
examines the Second and Third Circuits’ respective reframing of Tinker in
light of these intervening precedents. In particular, this Note addresses the
attempts by both circuits to resolve the difficulties in applying Tinker in the
context of the new digitized social media. Finally, this Note analyzes the
implications of the Second and Third Circuit opinions for the constitutional
status of student expression, and examines the current reach of First
Amendment protection in the broader context of off-campus student
expression.
I. A ROADMAP AND DIRECTIONS FOR REACHING THE “SCHOOLHOUSE GATE”
A. First Amendment Jurisprudence Before the Warren Court’s Tinker
Decision
The First Amendment of the Constitution provides that “Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”21 Protected speech
includes not only spoken words, but also conduct imbued with elements of
communication.22 In 1942, Justices Oliver Holmes and Louis Brandeis
20. See infra notes 136–39 and accompanying text; see also infra Part III.C.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Although freedom of speech is a fundamental cornerstone of
American democracy, this right is not absolute. For example, the government may restrict the
time, place, and manner of speech so long as: (1) the restriction placed on it serves an important
government interest, (2) the interest served by the regulation is unrelated to the suppression of the
particular message, (3) the regulation is narrowly tailored to the interest, and (4) the regulation
leaves open alternative means for communicating messages. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.
288, 293 (1984)). The Court has also permitted limited regulation of speech without regard to the
speech’s content; however, such content-based regulation is subject to the highest degree of
judicial scrutiny. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24–26 (1971). Additionally, there is speech
that categorically receives no First Amendment protection, including speech “directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action,” Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969), fighting
words, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942), obscenity, Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957), child pornography, New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764
(1982), and imminent threats, Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
22. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11, 414–15 (1974) (per curiam) (finding
that a college student who hung his American flag upside down conveyed a message to the
public, and that when applied to the case facts, a statute prohibiting such communicative conduct
violated the student’s right to freedom of speech); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141–42
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attempted to delineate the scope of protected expression by applying a costbenefit categorization principle, which separated protected First Amendment
speech from other forms of expression outside of the First Amendment.23
However, under this doctrine, the Court struggled to draw meaningful lines
between what constituted protected and unprotected expression,24 and the
legitimacy of withholding protection of certain speech met severe scholarly
resistance.25
In the 1960s, the Warren Court broadened First Amendment protections.26
Instead of limiting the protection of expression to certain categories of speech,
the Court “treat[ed] all speech as presumptively protected and consider[ed]
differences among various types of speech only in evaluating whether
particular restrictions were justified.”27 In doing so, the Court developed a
balancing test, applying strict scrutiny and the strongest possible presumption
in favor of free expression.28 It is within this context that the Court addressed
the freedom of speech in public schools.29
(1966) (noting that the First Amendment goes beyond verbal expression and protects the right “to
protest by silent and reproachful presence”). But cf. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–
77 (1968) (noting that burning a draft card contains both speech and non-speech aspects, and a
government regulation on such an action is sufficiently justified if it furthers an important
government interest unrelated to the suppression of speech).
23. KEITH WERHAN, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 70–71 (Jack Stark ed., 2004) (noting that in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the
Court used a “cost-benefit, balancing test to determine whether any particular category of speech
should be outside First Amendment protection”).
24. See WERHAN, supra note 23, at 72. The Chaplinksy test bars protection to forms of
speech that play “no essential part of any exposition of ideas and [is] of such slight social value as
a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from [it] is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality.” Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 568 (1942); see also WERHAN, supra
note 23, at 71.
25. WERHAN, supra note 23, at 72 (explaining that the Chaplinsky approach remains “a
continuing source of controversy”); see also Larry Alexander, Low Value Speech, 83 NW. U. L.
REV. 547, 547 (1989) (noting the difficulties that accompany the categorization of speech). But
see Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, Low Value Speech Revisited, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 555, 555
(1989) (advocating criteria to determine what is constitutionally protected speech in an effort to
help courts distinguish between “high value” and “low value” speech).
26. See, e.g., Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (holding that inflammatory speech is protected
unless it incites or is likely to incite imminent and lawless action); New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (extending First Amendment protection to libel laws by requiring proof
of actual malice in libel suits brought by public officials); see also G. Edward White, The First
Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of Free Speech in Twentieth-Century America, 95
MICH. L. REV. 299, 351 (1996) (describing the Warren Court “as the most significant institutional
champion of free speech to appear thus far in America”).
27. Nadine Strossen, Freedom of Speech in the Warren Court, in THE WARREN COURT: A
RETROSPECTIVE 68, 70 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1996).
28. CHRIS DEMASKE, MODERN POWER AND FREE SPEECH: CONTEMPORARY CULTURE AND
ISSUES OF EQUALITY 1 (Chris Demaske ed., 2009). The number of categories of unprotected
speech shrunk as a result of this balancing approach. Id. In an effort to protect speech, the Court
looked at traditional values underlying the principles of freedom of expression. See Sullivan, 376
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B. The Court Arrives at the Schoolhouse Gate with Tinker
The Supreme Court first attempted to develop clear student-speech
jurisprudence in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District.30 In this case, three students wore black armbands to school to protest
the Vietnam War.31 Upon learning of the students’ plan, the school adopted a
policy that required students wearing armbands to remove them or face
suspension.32 Although the three students knew of the newly adopted policy,
they wore the armbands to school, refused to remove them, and were
subsequently suspended by the school.33
The Court began its opinion by stating that “students or teachers [do not]
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate.”34 Although the Court reaffirmed the authority of school
officials to “prescribe and control conduct in the schools,” it explained that
control must be consistent with recognized constitutional safeguards.35
Deciding between the competing interests of freedom of speech and school
autonomy, the Court held that interference with a student’s speech is
constitutionally prohibited unless it can be shown that the speech would
“materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate
discipline in the operation of the school.”36

U.S. at 270 (concluding that the Court’s freedom of speech jurisprudence evolved from “the
background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials”); see also Strossen,
supra note 27, at 71–72 (noting the Warren Court’s willingness to scrutinize a broader array of
speech restrictions for potential First Amendment infringement).
29. Even before the Warren Court, the Supreme Court recognized that the First Amendment
offers protection of speech to public school students. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (reasoning that because schools “educat[e] the young for citizenship,”
students should be given the “scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual,
if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important
principles of our government as mere platitudes”).
30. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
31. Id. at 504.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 506.
35. Id. at 507. The Court also noted that students retain their status as “persons” under the
Constitution, even when at school. Id. at 511.
36. Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). The Court
rejected the lower court’s conclusion that the school authorities’ actions were reasonable because
they were based on a predetermined supposition that the armbands would create some
disturbance. Id. at 508. The Court found “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance”
insufficient to dispose of a person’s First Amendment right to free speech. Id.
In his dissent, Justice Hugo Black argued for more deference to school authorities and
attacked the majority’s use of a Lochner-esque “reasonableness” test in the manner of strict
scrutiny. Id. at 518–19 (Black, J., dissenting).
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This substantial-disruption test reflected the Court’s shift from the
categorization of speech toward a more balanced test built on a heavy
preference for freedom of speech.37 The Court in Tinker regarded the
American classroom—like American social life generally—as a “marketplace
of ideas,”38 and did not wish to confine the freedom of expression to “a
telephone booth or the four corners of a pamphlet, or to supervised and
ordained discussion in a school classroom.”39 The majority saw the classroom
as both a safe haven for constitutional freedoms and a place where students
could learn about their rights.40
With this philosophy, the Court reasoned that more than just a “mere desire
to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an
unpopular viewpoint” was required before school administrators could
intervene to censor or punish speech.41 The Court declared that the First
Amendment’s explicit language banning government abridgment of free
speech “means what it says.”42 These statements evidence the Warren Court’s
view that the First Amendment reached inside the schoolhouse gate.43
C. Post-Tinker Precedent Stipulates the Location of Schoolhouse Gateposts
In the cases following Tinker, the Supreme Court authorized regulation of
speech by school administrators not only when the speech causes a material
and substantial disruption of the school environment,44 but also when (1) the

37. See Thomas I. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CAL. L.
REV. 422, 441, 443 (1980) (noting that in the Warren Court’s view, freedom of expression trumps
censorship and any attempts to specifically enumerate what expression should receive
constitutional protection must be rejected).
38. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967)).
39. Id. at 513.
40. See id. at 511–12 (describing a school as a place involving “personal
intercommunication among the students” and therefore the protection of this student speech, for
the Warren Court, was a manner in which to advance one of the inherent purposes of the First
Amendment); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights at
the Schoolhouse Gates: What’s Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527, 532 (2000) (describing
the Tinker majority’s view that safeguarding speech at school is “a crucial part of educating
students about the Constitution”).
41. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509, 511 (“[Students] may not be regarded as closed-circuit
recipients of only that which the state chooses to communicate [nor] confined to the expression of
those sentiments that are officially approved.”).
42. Id. at 513.
43. See Frank D. LoMonte, Shrinking Tinker: Students Are “Persons” Under Our
Constitution—Except When They Aren’t, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1323, 1329 (2009) (asserting that
under the Warren Court’s formulation in Tinker, the scope of the First Amendment reaches into
the school with the limited exception of speech in a “curricular medium” sanctioned by the
school).
44. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
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speech created is lewd or vulgar,45 (2) the speech bears the school’s
imprimatur,46 or (3) the speech promotes drug use.47 Whether subsequent
cases relax Tinker or merely implicate Tinker’s own exception is yet to be
resolved.48 Either way, these later cases seemingly grant school administrators
greater deference and have also permitted school administrators further
protection under the doctrine of qualified immunity, which serves as a buffer
should the administrators err in judgment.49
1. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser: The Categorical Exception for
Vulgar Speech
Following Tinker, the Supreme Court addressed student speech in Bethel
School District No. 403 v. Fraser.50 Although the Court purported to apply
Tinker, Fraser validated a greater degree of judicial deference to school
administrators.51 In Fraser, a student gave a sexually explicit campaign speech
during a school assembly, which resulted in a three-day suspension for the
student.52 The school justified the suspension by contending that the speech
caused embarrassment and disruption among the students.53
The Court upheld the school’s disciplinary action.54 Although the Court
reaffirmed Tinker’s notion that students do not “shed their constitutional rights
at the schoolhouse gate,”55 it distinguished this “lewd and indecent speech”
from Tinker’s political speech.56 Emphasizing the necessity of a school’s

45. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685–86 (1986).
46. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272–73 (1988).
47. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007).
48. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
49. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–18 (1982).
50. 478 U.S. at 675.
51. Tracy L. Adamovich, Note, Return to Sender: Off-Campus Student Speech Brought OnCampus by Another Student, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1087, 1092 (2008) (noting that the holding in
Fraser “effectively shifted the focus of student expression from the rights of the students to the
needs of the educators and administrators, and showed an almost total judicial deference to the
schools”); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV.
1027, 1045–46 (2008) (discussing how Fraser’s shift from Tinker provided more deference to
school administrators to regulate that speech).
52. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677–78. Fraser delivered his speech, even after he had been warned
by teachers that it was inappropriate. Id. at 678. Bethel High School’s disciplinary rule stated,
“[c]onduct which materially and substantially interferes with the educational process is
prohibited, including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures.” Id.
53. Id. at 678 (noting that one teacher “found it necessary to forgo a portion of the
scheduled class lesson in order to discuss the speech with the class”).
54. Id. at 685.
55. Id. at 688 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969)).
56. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685; see Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404 (2007) (“The mode
of analysis employed in Fraser is not entirely clear.”); see also 2 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA
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control over student behavior, the Court held that this kind of “nonpolitical”
expression can be categorically prohibited without offending the Constitution
because toleration of such expression “undermine[d] the school’s basic
educational mission.”57 Balancing the need for “socially appropriate behavior”
with the importance of encouraging political and religious tolerance among
students, the Court held that regulation of vulgar and lewd speech must be
allowed to protect the school’s educational mission.58
2. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier: The Categorical Exception of
Legitimate Pedagogical Concerns
Less than two years after Fraser, the Supreme Court decided Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier—the second case that scaled back Tinker’s broad
First Amendment protection.59 In Kuhlmeier, the school removed two
student-written articles from the high school newspaper out of concern that the
articles violated students’ privacy rights and because the subject matter was
inappropriate.60 The Court framed the issue as whether the First Amendment
“require[d] a school affirmatively to promote particular student speech.”61 The
Court held that the school’s actions did not violate the First Amendment,
finding that student speech could be limited when it is related to a school’s
“legitimate pedagogical concerns.”62 Contrary to Tinker’s general preference
AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 17:4, at 17–28 (2011) (emphasizing the lack of clarity
as to the relationship between Fraser and Tinker).
57. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685. Fraser, however, never defined the scope of the school’s
educational function and the permissible values perceived through that function. See Benjamin F.
Heidlage, Note, A Relational Approach to Schools’ Regulation of Youth Online Speech, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 572, 577 (2009).
58. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685. The Court justified its decision by citing Justice Black’s
dissent in Tinker, further evidencing that it only gave cursory deference to Tinker. Id. (citing
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 526 (Black, J., dissenting)) (rejecting any implication that the Constitution
requires public schools to give up control over students).
59. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). See Mark W. Cordes,
Making Sense of High School Speech After Morse v. Frederick, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
657, 667 (2009) (noting that the Court’s distinction between tolerating speech and promoting
speech distanced Kuhlmeier from the protective approach in Tinker); Karly Zande, When the
School Bully Attacks in the Living Room: Using Tinker to Regulate Off-Campus Student
Cyberbullying, 13 BARRY L. REV. 103, 114 (2009) (stating that Kuhlmeier further restricted
Tinker’s holding and created another exception to the Tinker substantial-disruption test).
60. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 262–63. The principal removed the first article, which covered
current students’ pregnancies, to maintain the anonymity and privacy of the students covered in
the article. Id. at 263. The principal removed a second article about a student’s experience with
divorce because the student’s parents were not given the opportunity to respond to allegations
contained in the article. Id.
61. Id. at 270–71. The Court noted that the question in Tinker was whether a school needed
to tolerate particular student speech. Id. at 270.
62. Id. at 273. The Court stated that school administrators may exercise greater control over
on-campus student expression to ensure that students are presented with material suited to their
maturity level and that the speaker’s views are not imputed to the school. Id. at 271. This
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for freedom of speech, the Court in Kuhlmeier more closely paralleled
Fraser’s deference to school administration63 by articulating the notion that a
more relaxed standard of First Amendment protection applies for student
expression that occurs within the school’s “pedagogical” scope.64
3. Morse v. Frederick: The Categorical Exception of Referencing and
Promoting Illegal Drug Use
Almost twenty years passed before the Supreme Court heard another student
speech case, Morse v. Frederick, which shifted from an examination of speech
occurring on-campus to speech occurring off-campus.65 In Morse, a student
stood on a street opposite the school during school hours and unfurled a
fourteen-foot banner that read “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”66 When asked to take
the banner down, the student refused and received a ten-day suspension.67 The
school believed that the student sought to encourage illegal drug use and was
therefore in violation of the school code of conduct.68
The Court acknowledged Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier as precedent for
on-campus student speech; however, the Court avoided the issue of whether
these precedents also inform off-campus student speech cases by determining
that the student’s actions in Morse occurred on-campus.69 To reach this

allowed the school to “‘disassociate itself’ not only from speech that would ‘substantially
interfere with [its] work . . . or impinge upon the rights of other students,’ but also from speech
that [was], for example, ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or
prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences.” Id. (quoting Fraser, 478
U.S. at 685; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509).
63. As in Fraser, the Court in Kuhlmeier quoted Justice Black’s dissent in Tinker. Id. at
271 n.4; see Melinda Cupps Dickler, The Morse Quartet: Student Speech and the First
Amendment, 53 LOY. L. REV. 355, 367–68 (2007) (discussing Kuhlmeier’s favorable treatment of
Fraser in contrast to its dismissive treatment of Tinker); see also supra note 58.
64. See Dickler, supra note 63, at 368 (classifying the level of review in Kuhlmeier as
rational basis); see also Lee Goldman, Student Speech and the First Amendment: A
Comprehensive Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 395, 401 (2011). By citing the Fraser opinion, the
Court in Kuhlmeier reiterated the view that the educational mission of the school is valued more
than student speech. Goldman, supra, at 401.
65. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Carolyn Joyce Mattus, Is It Really My Space?:
Public Schools and Student Speech on the Internet After Layshock v. Hermitage School District
and Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District, 16 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 318, 321 (2010) (noting
that Morse is the only Supreme Court case addressing off-campus student speech).
66. Morse, 551 U.S. at 397. The student opened the banner during an approved “class event
or social trip,” where the school had given students permission to observe the Olympic torch relay
from the street near the school. Id.
67. Id. at 398.
68. Id. The school district’s policy prohibited expression that promoted the use of illegal
substances and applied the code of conduct to students when in school as well as when
participating in school-approved trips or school social events. Id.
69. Id. at 400–01, 403–06. The Court considered the student to be at school because he was
at an event that occurred during school hours with teachers in attendance, that included a
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conclusion, the Court interpreted Tinker narrowly, focusing on its language
regarding political speech.70 The Court then identified and applied two
principles from Fraser: (1) that student rights in a public school setting are not
“coextensive with the rights of adults,” and (2) that the “analysis set forth in
Tinker [was] not absolute.”71 The Court found that censoring drug-related
speech did not constitute a mere desire to avoid controversy,72 and that, under
the two principles derived from Fraser, schools were authorized to restrict
student expression that encouraged illegal drug use.73 The Court’s ruling in
Morse added yet another categorical exception to Tinker’s broad preference for
freedom of speech and reinforced the Court’s shift toward greater deference to
a school administration’s restriction of student speech.74
4. The Qualified Immunity Defense for Public School Officials
In the years following Tinker, the Supreme Court enunciated a lower
standard of review in cases that alleged violations by government officials
under the doctrine of qualified immunity.75 In the context of First Amendment
cases, qualified immunity is unanimously regarded as having a broad scope76
and allowing a state actor to defend against a civil lawsuit.77 In cases in which
performance by the school’s band and cheerleaders, and where he was visible to fellow
classmates. Id. at 400–01.
70. Id. at 403–04. The Court stressed Tinker’s finding that the school only desired to avoid
the discomfort of an unpopular viewpoint. Id. The Court rejected the dissent’s argument that the
message could be political by noting that the student had not argued the banner conveyed any
political or religious message. Id. at 402–03. The student argued that “the words were just
nonsense meant to attract television cameras.” Id. at 401.
71. Id. at 404–05 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)).
The Court commented that while the distinction made between the political message in Tinker
and the sexually explicit speech in Fraser was unclear, it was not necessary to resolve the debate
to proceed with the present case. Id. at 404.
72. Id. at 406–09 (relying on Fourth Amendment cases, legislation, and social and medical
studies, the Court determined that drug-use prevention among school-aged children was an
important and compelling interest).
73. Id. at 408, 410.
74. See id. at 397 (“[W]e hold that schools may take steps to safeguard [students] from
speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use.”); see also Harriet A.
Hoder, Supervising Cyberspace: A Simple Threshold for Public School Jurisdiction over
Students’ Online Activity, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1563, 1570 (2009) (arguing that the decisions rendered
in Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse demonstrated a general trend toward giving deference to a
school’s authority to regulate student speech); Sarah O. Cronan, Note, Grounding Cyberspeech:
Public Schools’ Authority to Discipline Students for Internet Activity, 97 KY. L.J. 149, 157 (2008)
(commenting that Morse created another exception to Tinker).
75. See generally Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (discussing the need for
qualified immunity as applied to executive officials exercising their discretion and articulating the
relevant standard of review); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
76. Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 VAND. L. REV. 583,
651 (1998).
77. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
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a state actor’s conduct does not clearly violate a federal statute or a
constitutional right “of which a reasonable person would have known,” he or
she is entitled to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity.78 A court
considering the defense must first examine whether the facts, viewed in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate a violation of the
constitutional right by the state actor.79 If that burden is met, the court must
then decide whether the right at issue was established clearly at the time the
conduct occurred.80 The Supreme Court recently decided that lower courts
may exercise discretion when determining which prong to consider first.81 If
the conduct does not violate a clearly established constitutional right, or if the
state actor reasonably believes the right did not exist, he is immune from civil
liability.82
II. JURISPRUDENCE IN THE SECOND AND THIRD CIRCUITS: “UPDATING” TINKER
AND RELEVANT INTERVENING PRECEDENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF ONLINE
SPEECH
As a result of the muddled post-Tinker jurisprudence, lower-court opinions
on student speech vary greatly.83 The legal community eagerly anticipated the
Court’s decision in Morse because it provided an opportunity for the Court to
address off-campus speech;84 however, because the Court limited its holding, it
never reached the issue.85 As a result, the boundaries of a school’s authority to

78. Id. at 815, 818.
79. Saucier v. Katz 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled on other grounds by Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
80. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232.
81. Id. at 242.
82. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
83. See, e.g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 499
(2011); Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d
Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); see also Benjamin T. Bradford,
Comment, Is It Really MySpace? Our Disjointed History of Public School Discipline for Student
Speech Needs a New Test for an Online Era, 3 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 323, 330–31 (2010)
(pointing out that the Supreme Court has applied four different tests in Tinker, Fraser, Kuhlmeier
and Morse, and commenting on Justice Clarence Thomas’s confusion in his Morse dissent about
whether Tinker still applies to student-speech cases); Allison E. Hayes, Note, From Armbands to
Douchebags: How Doninger v. Niehoff Shows the Supreme Court Needs to Address Student
Speech in the Cyber Age, 43 AKRON L. REV. 247, 255 (2010).
84. See Dickler, supra note 63, at 356 (discussing the desire for clarification of Tinker and
its application in subsequent cases).
85. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 400–01 (2007); see supra note 69 and accompanying
text.
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restrict off-campus speech have not yet been determined by the Supreme
Court.86
A. Third Circuit Cases and Off-Campus Cyberspeech
1. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School District
Although the Supreme Court has avoided addressing a school’s authority to
regulate off-campus speech, lower courts have confronted the issue with
inconsistent results.87 The Third Circuit first ruled on the issue in Layshock ex
rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School District, in which the student, Layshock,
created a “parody profile” of his principal on the social-media website
MySpace from his grandmother’s home.88 In response to the website, the
school suspended Layshock for ten days, banned him from extracurricular
activities, prohibited him from attending graduation events, and required him
to attend the Alternate Education Program for the remaining portion of the
school year.89
The Third Circuit held that the school’s disciplinary actions violated the
student’s First Amendment rights.90 The court noted that because the school
district did not use the Tinker rule to justify the suspension, the court was able
to avoid the issue of whether Tinker applied to off-campus speech.91 The court
86. See Mary Sue Backus, OMG! Missing the Teachable Moment and Undermining the
Future of the First Amendment—TISNF!, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 153, 165 (2009) (describing
the uncertainty lower courts have when addressing off-campus speech).
87. See Todd D. Erb, Comment, A Case for Strengthening School District Jurisdiction to
Punish Off-Campus Incidents of Cyberbullying, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 257, 263–66 (2008) (discussing
the varying approaches and results between lower courts in attempting to analyze off-campus
student speech cases under Tinker and its progeny).
88. Layschock, 650 F.3d at 207–08. MySpace is a social-media website where users create
profiles of themselves by uploading videos, photographs, and personal information. Id. at 208.
The profile at issue in Layshock included a survey with answers that mocked the principal’s large
size by repeatedly using the word “big.” Id. The student accessed his parody profile at school
and showed it to his fellow classmates. Id. at 209. Subsequently, three classmates created three
additional parody profiles. Id. at 208.
89. Id. at 210. Although the other parody profiles contained more vulgar and offensive
content, Layshock was the only student punished. Id. Layshock’s actions violated the school
district’s disciplinary code, which barred “[d]isruption of the normal school process; [d]isrespect;
[h]arassment of a school administrator via computer/internet with remarks that have demeaning
implications; [g]ross misbehavior; [o]bscene, vulgar and profane language; [and] Computer
Policy violations (use of school pictures without authorization).” Id. at 209–10.
90. Id. at 207.
91. Id. at 214. Although the district court did not find “a sufficient nexus between [the
student’s] speech and a substantial disruption of the school environment,” the school district did
not challenge that point on appeal. Id. (quoting Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch.
Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 600 (W.D. Pa. 2007)). Instead, the school argued that there was a
nexus between the profile’s use and circulation on school property such that the school could
regulate the speech. Id. at 214–15. Under this theory, the court concluded that because Layshock
had accessed the school website to obtain a photo of the principal, the speech originated on-
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did consider Layshock’s access to the profile at school, but ultimately relied on
a decision by the Second Circuit in which the court determined that the First
Amendment prohibits schools from restricting speech that occurs outside the
classroom at an activity not sponsored by the school.92
The Third Circuit also concluded that the school could not punish the
student simply because the speech came within the school.93 Although the
school district cited three cases as support for allowing a school to censor
vulgar speech made online,94 the Layshock court distinguished these cases by
explaining that each case evoked a substantial disruption of the school
environment.95
The Third Circuit leaned toward Tinker’s analysis by emphasizing the
district court’s determination that the parody profile caused no disruption in the
school environment and that only certain narrow circumstances—not present in
this case—would authorize regulating off-campus speech.96 The court,
therefore, gave minimal deference to the school authorities in regulating
speech occurring outside the confines of the schoolhouse gate and adhered to
the spirit of Tinker and its permissive approach toward protection of student
expression.97

campus. Id. at 215. Moreover, the speech targeted those in the school community and was
accessed by Layshock on school computers. Id. at 216. Therefore, the school concluded, it was
“reasonably foreseeable that the profile would come to the attention of the School District and the
Principal.” Id.
92. Id. at 215 (citing Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1045–50 (2d Cir. 1979)).
Thomas v. Board of Education involved disciplinary action taken against students who had
created a satirical paper, which included articles on masturbation and prostitution. Thomas, 607
F.2d at 1045. Although the students distributed the paper off-campus and not during school
hours, some activities involving the paper occurred on school grounds. Id. The Second Circuit
found that the activity in the school was de minimis and thus could not be punished by the school.
Id. at 1050. In Layshock, the court determined that if Thomas involved conduct that was not seen
as sufficient to establish a nexus between the conduct and school, then the requisite nexus did not
exist in the present case. Layshock, 650 F.2d at 216. The court recognized the danger of
allowing schools to reach into the homes of its students and control their actions. Id. Although,
the court admitted that under Tinker the “schoolhouse gate” is not limited to the confines of
school property, it noted that the authority of school administrators does have boundaries and
limits. Id. Relying on Morse, the court emphasized that school authority reaches only to schoolsponsored events. Id. (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007)).
93. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 216.
94. Id. at 217. The school relied on Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008),
Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007), and J.S.
Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002).
95. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 217.
96. Id. at 219.
97. Id. (“[O]ur willingness to defer to the schoolmaster’s expertise in administering school
discipline rests, in large measure, upon the supposition that the arm of authority does not reach
beyond the schoolhouse gate.” (quoting Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1044–45)).
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2. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District: The Third Circuit
Re-emphasizes the Centrality of Tinker
In J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District, the Third Circuit
again addressed the scope of First Amendment protection of off-campus
student expression.98 In Snyder, an eighth-grade student, J.S., created a fake
MySpace profile of her principal from her home computer.99 The school found
J.S. to be in violation of the school’s disciplinary code and suspended her for
ten days.100 The school argued that the profile disrupted the school by creating
general “rumblings” among students.101
The court applied Tinker in its analysis, although it never explicitly
articulated that Tinker’s substantial-disruption test applied to off-campus
speech.102 Although the parties agreed that no substantial disruption actually
occurred at school, the school argued that, given the circumstances, it was
reasonable to forecast that a profile would cause disruption of school
activities.103 The court compared the case to the facts in Tinker and concluded
that if armbands protesting the Vietnam War did not reasonably forecast a
disruption in the school environment, a MySpace profile about the principal
similarly did not make a forecast of substantial disruption reasonable.104 The
court also looked to Fraser, as the court had in Layshock, and concluded that
Fraser did not apply to off-campus speech.105 In its conclusion, the court
highlighted that school authorities may not punish off-campus speech that was

98. J.S. ex rel Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc),
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
99. Id. at 920. The profile displayed a photo of the principal and described him as a “tight
ass,” “fagass,” “pervert,” and “dick head.” Id. at 920–21. No student accessed the profile at
school; however, another student informed the principal of the website and brought him a printout
of the profile. Id. at 921.
100. Id. at 921–22. Under the school’s disciplinary policy, the principal found the profile to
be “a false accusation about a staff member of the school and a ‘copyright’ violation of the
computer use policy, for using [the principal’s] photograph.” Id. at 921.
101. Id. at 922.
102. Id. at 926 (“The Supreme Court established a basic framework for assessing student free
speech claims in Tinker, and we will assume, without deciding, that Tinker applies to J.S.’s
speech in this case.”).
103. Id. at 928 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514
(1964)). The school argued that the fake MySpace profile “was accusatory and aroused suspicion
among the school community.” Id. at 930. The court disageed, stating that “[t]he profile was so
outrageous that no one could have taken it seriously,” and that, unlike the three cases the school
district relied on for support, J.S. did not intend for the profile to reach the school community
because she took precautions to keep the profile private so that only her friends could view it. Id.
104. Id. at 929–30. Even though the armbands worn by the three students in Tinker diverted
attention to the “highly emotional and controversial subject of the Vietnam war,” the Supreme
Court did not find any facts to lead school officials to a reasonable forecast of substantial
disruption in the school environment. Id.
105. Id. at 932 (“[Had] Fraser delivered the same speech in a public forum outside the school
context, it would have been protected.” (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007)).
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not school-sponsored, did not occur at a school-sponsored event, or did not
cause a substantial disruption of school activities.106
Throughout Snyder, the court emphasized Tinker’s strong preference for
student speech, and interpreted Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse as narrow
limitations to Tinker.107 The concurring judges underscored the need for courts
to “tolerate thoughtless speech like J.S.’s to provide adequate breathing room
for valuable, robust speech—the kind that enriches the marketplace of ideas,
promotes self-government, and contributes to self-determination.”108 To do
otherwise, the majority contended, would bestow a totalitarian power on the
school administration to authorize censorship of student speech outside the
schoolhouse gate in contradiction to Tinker.109
B. The Second Circuit: Doninger v. Niehoff
In Doninger v. Niehoff the Second Circuit diverged from the Third Circuit’s
approach of interpreting and analyzing off-campus student cyberspeech under
Tinker and its progeny.110 The student, Doninger, used school computers to
contact people through a mass e-mail and blog and requested that they contact
her school regarding a cancelled concert.111 Her prompt resulted in a deluge of
phone calls and e-mails to the school, forcing the principal and faculty

106. Id. at 933 (“[T]o apply the Fraser standard to justify the School District’s punishment of
J.S.’s speech would be to adopt a rule that allows school officials to punish any speech by a
student that takes place anywhere, at any time, as long as it is about the school or a school
official, is brought to the attention of a school official, and is deemed “offensive” by the
prevailing authority.”).
107. Id. at 927 (stating that Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse were “narrow” exceptions to
Tinker). The Third Circuit commented on Justice Samuel Alito’s concurrence in Morse,
highlighting his view that Morse stood “at the far reaches of what the First Amendment permits.”
Id. (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 425 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring)). The court
further explained that Justice Alito’s concurrence in Morse was predicated on his understanding
that the majority’s opinion did not allow “the special characteristics of the public schools [to]
necessarily justify any other speech restrictions than those recognized by the Court in Tinker,
Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse.” Id. (quoting Morse, 551 U.S. at 423 (Alito, J., concurring)).
108. Id. at 941 (Smith, J., concurring).
109. See id. at 933 (majority opinion). Advocates for the freedom of student speech have
classified the Third Circuit decisions in Layshock and Snyder as “landmark” rulings, and a victory
for students across the nation. Seth Zweifler, Third Circuit Sides with Students in Online Speech
Fight: Landmark Rulings Leave Some Questions Unanswered, STUDENT PRESS L. CENTER (June
13, 2011), http://www.splc.org/news/newsflash.asp?id=2238.
110. See Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499
(2011).
111. Id. at 339–40. The email, addressed to parents, students, and others, informed recipients
that the concert could not be held in the auditorium. Id. Doninger solicited everyone to contact
the administration office and ask for the event to be held in the auditorium. Id. That evening,
Doninger posted on her livejournal.com blog that the “douchebags in central office” canceled the
concert. Id. at 340–41. Doninger encouraged others to continue contacting the principal in an
effort to “piss her off more.” Id. at 341.
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members in charge of the concert to miss school-related activities.112 When
Doninger’s blog post calling the administrators “douchebags” came to the
attention of school officials, the school barred her from seeking nomination for
senior class secretary and prohibited her from wearing a “Team Avery” shirt
on election day.113
Unlike the Third Circuit, the Second Circuit used two lines of reasoning to
address and ultimately uphold the school’s disciplinary action against
Doninger. The Doninger court glossed over Tinker, Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and
Morse.114 Instead, the court relied on the doctrine of qualified immunity—a
defense that the court asserted would circumscribe the Supreme Court’s First
Amendment student-speech cases if its requirements were met.115
The court ultimately concluded that the school satisfied the two-prong test
necessary to establish qualified immunity.116 The court first examined whether
a constitutional right was clearly established.117 The court rejected Doninger’s
argument that both Supreme Court precedent and Second Circuit
112. Id.
113. Id. at 340, 342–43. The school claimed Doninger violated the student handbook’s
good-citizenship clause, which required that “[a]ll students elected to student offices . . . shall
have and maintain good citizenship records. Any student who does not maintain a good
citizenship record shall not be allowed to represent fellow students nor the schools for a period of
time recommended by the student’s principal.” Id. at 339. Doninger’s name did not appear on
the election ballot, but students wore “Team Avery” shirts and voted for her as a write-on
candidate on Election Day. Id. at 343. The principal instructed those wearing the shirt to remove
them, claiming they were “disruptive” and “set[] a bad example.” Id.
114. Id. at 344–45. The court interpreted Tinker as holding that a school may prohibit
student speech that “materially and substantially disrupt[s]” the school environment. Id. at 344
(quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)). The
Doninger court read Fraser as stating that schools need to teach socially acceptable behavior and
this need allows administrators to regulate speech that might otherwise be protected outside of
school. Id. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681–82 (1986)). The
court read Kuhlmeier as reiterating that schools may control school-sponsored speech as long as it
“reasonably relates to legitimate pedagogical concern[s].” Id. at 345 (quoting Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988)). Finally, the court characterized Morse as standing
for the proposition that schools can regulate speech that encourages illegal drug use. Id. (quoting
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007)).
115. Id.
116. The test for qualified immunity requires examining the official’s conduct to see if he or
she violated a constitutional right and whether the right was clearly established. Id. at 345
(quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009); Gilles v. Repicky, 511 F.3d 239, 244 (2d
Cir. 2007)). The order of these inquiries is left to the court’s discretion. Id. (citing Pearson, 555
U.S. at 242).
117. Id. The court explained that a clearly established right exists if “(1) it was defined with
reasonable certainty, (2) the Supreme Court or the Second Circuit has confirmed the existence of
the right, and (3) a reasonable defendant would have understood that his conduct was unlawful.”
Id. (citing Young v. Cnty. of Fulton, 160 F.3d 899, 903 (2d Cir. 1998)). The court clarified that a
right is clearly established “in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general
proposition.” Id. (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), abrogated on other grounds
by Pearson, 555 U.S. at 242).
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jurisprudence118 protected Doninger’s off-campus speech, and concluded that
there was no clearly established right to First Amendment protection.119 In
support of its conclusion, the court pointed to the fact that Tinker permits
school officials to regulate substantially disruptive speech.120 Contrary to the
Third Circuit, however, the Second Circuit’s analysis of the Supreme Court
cases centered on language in those opinions that limited the freedom of
speech afforded to students within the schoolhouse gate.121 This approach
gives deference to school authorities to regulate student speech.
In response to Doninger’s assertion that school regulations must satisfy
Tinker’s substantial disruption test even when the school is permitted to
regulate off-campus speech,122 the Second Circuit categorized the rules in
Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse as distinct from Tinker, and reasoned that they
did not limit regulation of off-campus speech to Tinker.123 Moreover, given
the facts of the case, the court held that even under a Tinker standard, the
school reasonably found the blog post potentially disruptive.124

118. Id. at 347.
119. Id. at 346–47. In support of its determination that a right was not clearly established, the
court noted that “the ‘Supreme Court has yet to speak on the scope of a school’s authority to
regulate expression that, like Avery’s, does not occur on school grounds or at a school-sponsored
event.’” Id. at 346 (quoting Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2008)). The court
rejected Doninger’s assertion that Supreme Court precedent offered her protection from
disciplinary action for off-campus speech, “no matter its relation to school affairs or its likelihood
of having effects—even substantial and disruptive effects—in school.” Id. The court also
rejected the argument that the Second Circuit had clearly established a right to protection of offcampus speech. Id. at 346–47. Although the Second Circuit had found in favor of protecting the
student speech in Thomas v. Board of Education, the opinion included a caveat that in some
instances, off-campus speech could create a substantial disruption within the school, making
disciplinary aciton appropriate. Id. (quoting Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 n.17
(2d Cir. 1979)).
120. Id. at 347–48. The court asserted that “[i]t is thus incorrect to urge . . . that Supreme
Court precedent necessarily insulates students from discipline for speech-related activity
occurring away from school property.” Id. at 346.
121. Id. at 344; see supra note 114.
122. Doninger, 642 F.3d at 347.
123. See id. at 347–48. The court indicated that it had previously opined on the uncertain
applicability of Fraser to offensive off-campus speech. Id. at 348 (citing Donninger, 527 F.3d at
49–50).
124. Id. at 348–49. The court reasoned that because Doninger’s blog post related to a school
event, invited others to contact school officials, elucidated students’ comments on the post, and
became known to the school, it was undisputed that such a blog post would disrupt the school
environment. Id. at 349.
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III. ANALYSIS: FUNDAMENTALLY DIVERSE ALTERNATIVES TO THE
TREATMENT OF TINKER IN THE CONTEXT OF STUDENT EXPRESSION IN DIGITAL
SOCIAL MEDIA
The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the scope of First Amendment
protection accorded to student expression in digital social media.125 Lower
courts have looked to Tinker when determining whether schools’ disciplinary
actions restricting off-campus student speech constituted legitimate uses of
power.126 Lower courts have also considered Fraser,127 in which the Court
held that schools can regulate “sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech”;128
however, courts less often apply Fraser to off-campus speech.129 The lack of
Supreme Court guidance has led to differing analytical approaches among
courts deciding cases that involve off-campus student speech.130
The Second and Third Circuits’ adoption of varying analyses to decide cases
involving off-campus student speech illustrate the inconsistency among lower
courts.131 Although both circuits looked to Tinker and Fraser in their analyses,
their interpretations of the cases varied, leading to a drastic difference in their
jurisprudential stance on student speech and its protection under the First
Amendment.132

125. See supra note 86 and accompanying text; see also James M. Patrick, Comment, The
Civility-Police: The Rising Need to Balance Students’ Rights to Off-Campus Internet Speech
Against the School’s Compelling Interests, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 855, 864–85 (2010) (noting that
the Supreme Court has not addressed off-campus speech).
126. See, e.g., D.J.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 757, 760–61 (8th Cir.
2011); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 571–72 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 80
U.S.L.W. 3427 (2012); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d
34, 38–39 (2d Cir. 2007); Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1370 (S.D. Fla. 2010); Requa v.
Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 492 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1279–80 (W.D. Wash. 2007); Mahaffey v.
Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 783–84 (E.D. Mich. 2002); Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92
F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
127. See, e.g., Coy v. Bd. of Educ. of the N. Canton City Schs., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791, 798
(N.D. Ohio 2002); Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 452–53 (W.D. Pa.
2001); Emmett, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 1090.
128. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986).
129. See, e.g., Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 456, 457 (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 688
(Brennan, J., concurring)) (“Although we agree that several passages from the list are lewd,
abusive, and derogatory, we cannot ignore the fact that the relevant speech . . . occurred within
the confines of [the student’s] home, far removed from any school premises or facilities.”).
130. See Samantha M. Levin, Note, School Districts As Weathermen: The School’s Ability To
Reasonably Forecast Substantial Disruption to the School Environment From Students’ Online
Speech, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 859, 870 (2011) (noting the lower courts’ lack of uniformity).
131. See supra Part II.A–B.
132. See supra Part II.A–B.
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A. Applying Tinker to Off-Campus Speech
Lower courts have chosen to apply Tinker and its substantial disruption test
in cases of off-campus student speech with varying results.133 Among these,
the Third Circuit has upheld Tinker’s fundamental principle that deference is
given to student speech,134 while the Second Circuit seemed to implicitly rely
on Justice Black’s approach in his Tinker dissent and his reference to the
maxim, “[c]hildren are to be seen not heard.”135
The Second Circuit asserted that Tinker applied to off-campus speech in
Doninger.136 However, the court noted that in not defining Tinker’s full scope,
the Supreme Court had not specifically held that all off-campus student speech
was protected from disciplinary action.137 Though Tinker would counsel
against such deference to a school’s authority, the Second Circuit focused on
language in Fraser and Kuhlmeier that emphasized the need to teach students
acceptable social behavior.138 For the Second Circuit, these cases indicated
that off-campus student speech was not an unequivocally protected right.139
While the Third Circuit did not explicitly apply Tinker to off-campus
speech, language in its opinions lends credence to the view that it might do
so.140 In Snyder, the Third Circuit used Tinker as a backdrop for its analysis
133. See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 39
(2d Cir. 2007) (allowing for regulation of off-campus speech if it was reasonably foreseeable that
the speech would reach school property); J.C. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d
1094, 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“[T]he geographic origin of the speech is not material; Tinker
applies to both on-campus and off-campus speech.”); Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365,
1371–72 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (suggesting that Tinker would apply to off-campus speech if the offcampus speech was aimed at the school); Neal v. Efurd, No. 04-2195, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
47296, at *12 (W.D. Ark. Feb. 18, 2005) (finding that a student’s website did not cause a
substantial disruption and permanently enjoining the school from taking action against the
student). But see Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 784 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (refusing to
apply Tinker to off-campus speech); Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D.
Wash. 2000) (finding that a student’s website was off-campus speech and therefore outside the
scope of school regulation).
134. See supra Part II.A.
135. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 522 (1969) (Black, J.,
dissenting); see also supra Part II.B.
136. Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 346–47 (2d Cir. 2011).
137. Id. at 346.
138. Id. at 344 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986)); see
also id. at 345 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988))
(emphasizing a school’s legitimate “pedagogical concerns”); cf. Abby Marie Mollen, Comment,
In Defense of the “Hazardous Freedom” of Controversial Student Speech, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
1501, 1507 n.37 (2008) (observing that both the Fraser and Kuhlmeier decisions parallel Justice
Black’s dissent in Tinker more than the majority’s opinion).
139. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. Judge Jordon argued in a concurring opinion
in Layshock that Tinker did apply to off-campus speech. Layshock ex rel. Layshockv. Hermitage
Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 220 (3d Cir. 2011) (Jordan, J., concurring), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097
(2012).
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and noted the difficulty in balancing the school’s authority to regulate speech
with the First Amendment rights of students.141 Although not explicitly
applying Tinker to the student’s speech,142 the Third Circuit reached its
conclusion based on a framework that appropriately conformed to Tinker’s
preference for freedom of speech.143 The court acknowledged that a student’s
constitutional rights within the confines of the school’s property are not
parallel to those of an adult,144 and concluded that Tinker’s substantial
disruption rule was the general rule and that the subsequent Supreme Court
cases were narrow exceptions to that rule.145
B. The Proper Integration of the Tinker Doctrine into the Exception
Enunciated in Fraser
Despite the Second and Third Circuits’ examinations of Tinker in the context
of off-campus student speech, the courts differed in how they believed Fraser,
Kuhlmeier, and Morse were should be aligned under Tinker, ultimately leading
to conflicting views on Fraser’s applicability to off-campus speech.146 The
Third Circuit stated that Fraser did not apply to conduct occurring outside the
schoolhouse gates, except in very narrow circumstances.147 The Second
Circuit was unclear as to whether Fraser applied, but would not limit Fraser’s
application under a Tinker analysis.148
In Snyder, the Third Circuit refused to apply Fraser’s lewdness standard to
off-campus student speech.149 The court characterized Fraser as an exception
to the freedom of speech principle propounded in Tinker, not as an equal and
independent doctrine.150 To support its holding, the Third Circuit cited Morse
141. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 925–27 (3d Cir. 2011) (en
banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). The court acknowledged that schools’ relationships
with their students are “custodial and tutelary,” and reasoned that although courts generally
exercise restraint in reviewing issues arising under the context of school officials, the “vigilant
protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American
schools.” Id. at 925–26 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 475 v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)).
142. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
143. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 926.
144. Id. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)).
145. Id. (citing Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 212 (3d Cir. 2001)).
146. See supra notes 107, 121, and 123 and accompanying text.
147. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 219 (3d Cir. 2011),
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1-97 (2012); see also J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650
F.3d 915, 932 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (expressly stating tht Fraser is unapplicable to speech
occuring off-campus), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
148. Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 344, 348 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Doninger v. Niehoff,
527 F.3d 41, 49–50 (2d Cir. 2008)), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011).
149. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 932 (“Fraser’s ‘lewdness’ standard cannot be extended to justify a
school’s punishment of J.S. for use of profane language outside the school, during non-school
hours.”).
150. Id.
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and indicated that the student speech in that case would have received First
Amendment protection had it occurred off-campus.151 The court explained that
Morse determined that a student’s off-campus speech receives the same
protection as that of an adult; therefore, a state agent may not impede those
The Third Circuit’s
rights absent a constitutionally valid reason.152
interpretation correctly limited Fraser’s application to school property and
characterized it as an exception falling under Tinker’s general preference for
protecting student speech.153
The application of Fraser to off-campus student speech would give schools
wide latitude to restrict student speech even though the Supreme Court has
never authorized schools to punish students for off-campus speech that is
unrelated to school activities or that does not cause a substantial disruption.154
As the Third Circuit contended, the application of Fraser to off-campus speech
could lead to a rule allowing schools to restrict or discipline student speech that
occurs in any forum so long as it relates in any way to the school or its
administrators and is found vulgar or offensive.155
Interpreting Fraser, Kuhlmeier, or Morse as independent rules apart from
the principles laid forth in Tinker contradicts Tinker’s expansive holding.156
By expanding Fraser to allow for censorship of off-campus student speech, a
court would reach contradictory results from one that viewed Fraser as a mere
exception to Tinker’s general rule.157 The result in cases such as Layshock and
Snyder would differ if a court applied the Second Circuit’s view of Fraser, not
as a strict limitation to the general rule in Tinker, but as a separate doctrine
potentially applicable to off-campus student speech.158
C. The Second Circuit’s Application of Qualified Immunity Neutralizes Tinker
and Ensures Tinker Has No Meaningful Application in the Area of Student
Expression
The Second Circuit ultimately did not reach the question of whether the
school violated the student’s First Amendment rights in Doninger.159 Instead,
151. Id. (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007)).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 931–32.
154. Id. at 932–33.
155. Id. at 933.
156. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (noting
that the Constitution permits free speech regulations only “in carefully restricted circumstances”).
157. See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 933 (reasoning that students who bad-mouthed a teacher at a
private party could be punished if courts interpreted Fraser to apply to off-campus speech).
158. See Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 348 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499
(2011); see also Allison Belnap, Comment, Tinker at a Breaking Point: Why the Specter of
Cyberbullying Cannot Excuse Impermissible Public School Regulation of Off-Campus Student
Speech, 2011 B.Y.U. L. REV. 501, 516 (2011) (classifying the Second Circuit’s approach to
off-campus speech as the most expansive standard for regulating off-campus student speech).
159. Doninger, 642 F.3d at 346.
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the Second Circuit used the doctrine of qualified immunity to refute the
student’s claim.160 The effect of requiring Doninger to show that a
constitutional right was clearly established was to add a barrier to Doninger’s
freedom of speech protection that is antithetical to Tinker’s emphasis on
protecting students’ speech.
The Second Circuit sought to determine whether Doninger’s First
Amendment rights were clearly established, but opined that because a
determination is sometimes so nuanced, meeting this standard is exceedingly
difficult.161 Therefore, the Second Circuit gave school officials ultimate
deference, finding that not even lawyers and judges could interpret the cases
involving student speech in a consistent manner such that a clear right was
established.162
D. A Circuit Split or a Mere Fact-Specific Difference?
Although the Second and Third Circuits’ application of Tinker and its
progeny differed, the facts of the cases in each circuit differed as well. The
Third Circuit addressed the suspension of a student,163 while the Second
Circuit dealt with a school’s refusal to allow a student to run for a class
office.164 The Third Circuit noted the differences in disciplinary action taken
by the schools in Doninger and Layshock, but it pointed out that by citing the
Second Circuit’s Doninger decision, it was disagreeing with the conclusion
that Doninger’s off-campus conduct was not protected by the First
Amendment.165
In addition to the differences in disciplinary action taken by the schools, the
effects of each student’s speech on the school varied. Doninger reached out
and encouraged people to contact her school in an effort to “piss [the principal]
off more.”166 This could be seen as incitement—an exception to the general
protection accorded under the First Amendment.167 Though the speech
occurred off-campus, it resulted in a number of calls made to the school and

160. Id.
161. Id. at 353.
162. Id. The court stated, “The law governing restrictions on student speech can be difficult
and confusing, even for lawyers, law professors, and judges. The relevant Supreme Court cases
can be hard to reconcile, and courts often struggle to determine which standard applies in any
particular case.” Id.
163. See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir.
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650
F.3d 915, 920 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
164. Doninger, 642 F.3d at 338.
165. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 218.
166. Doninger, 642 F.3d at 341.
167. Bradenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (providing that the First Amendment
does not prevent a state from forbidding “advocacy [that] is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action”).
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caused teachers to miss school-related activities.168 In contrast, the students in
the Third Circuit cases did not reach out into the community with their actions,
but instead created Internet profiles and distributed them among friends.169 In
Snyder, the student even restricted access to the MySpace profile after other
students became aware of it.170
Lastly, the facts differ as to where access to the student speech occurred. In
Doninger and Snyder, the blogs and Internet pages were created at home and
were never accessed on campus.171 In Layshock, however, the student
accessed the website at school and showed it to some classmates.172
Additionally, in Layshock, it could be argued that the profile presented lewd
and vulgar on-campus speech, and that under Fraser censorship would be
appropriate.173 The Third Circuit, though, found that the speech was
conducted off-campus,174 and refused to extend Fraser to off-campus student
speech.175
The conflict between the Second and Third Circuit decisions manifests a
need for the Supreme Court to demonstrate and address the proper analysis for
schools’ discipline of off-campus student speech. Even though both circuits
similarly applied Tinker to off-campus speech, their applications of Fraser
differed. Arguably, the differing facts in the circuit decisions are distinct
enough to justify the opposing conclusions. Nonetheless, even identical facts
would likely lead to contradictory rulings given the circuits’ analyses on this
issue.176 This establishes the necessity for a cohesive standard that all courts
can apply to the rising number of off-campus student speech cases.177
IV. CONCLUSION
The split between the Second and Third Circuits affirms the need for the
Supreme Court to address off-campus student speech. Although the three
Supreme Court cases subsequent to Tinker reflect a general trend toward
168. Doninger, 642 F.3d at 341.
169. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 208; J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d
915, 921 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
170. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 921.
171. Doninger, 642 F.3d at 338, 340; Snyder, 650 F.3d at 920, 921 (noting that the school
network blocked access to MySpace).
172. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 209.
173. Id. at 208 (describing the nature and content of the MySpace profile).
174. Id. at 216 (finding the relationship between the off-campus speech and the school too
attenuated to render it on-campus).
175. Id.
176. See supra Part II.A–B.
177. See Kathleen Conn, Commentary, The Long and Short of the Public School’s
Disciplinary Arm: Will Morse v. Frederick Make a Difference?, 227 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 3 (2008)
(“[T]he most frequently litigated challenges to school officials’ imposition of suspensions or
expulsions for out-of-school student offenses occur when school officials discipline students for
speech originating outside school.”).
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deference to a school’s authority to regulate student speech, the Third Circuit
adhered to Tinker’s free speech preference and characterized Fraser,
Kuhlmeier, and Morse as strict exceptions to Tinker’s overarching rule.178 The
Second Circuit, on the other hand, stripped Tinker of its foundation, and
characterized the narrow exceptions derived from the subsequent cases as
alternative means to regulate student speech. The methods and standards used
in reaching the decisions in both the Second and Third Circuits are arguably
different, and the facts of each case vary significantly as well. The lack of a
clear and comprehensive standard to determine when a school is authorized to
censor student expression should be addressed so that courts can reach
consistent opinions regardless of the facts.
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